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The American international relations (IR) theories neorealism and offensive realism assume that there is a universal rationality behind states' quest for power; the theories differ only in their approaches to risk behavior (see . In contrast, advocates of strategic culture point out that elites conditioned by different cultural environments may make different choices when placed in similar situations (Johnston 1995: 35, 38) . Ranked preferences are one method for determining strategic culture (Johnston 1995: 48) . Power indexes are generally a more tangible source of information because the preferences are already quantified and weighted; by knowing the details of power formulas one may thus infer national priorities and possibly make predictions regarding national strategy.
Power formulas partly express the idiosyncratic views of their designers, partly express the culturally based preferences and priorities of their respective society, and partly express the universal pursuit of power in the form of capability and resources. While power formulas rarely come along with explicitly new perspectives and definitions, they may contain new variables and new methods of calculation, which appear to be the most important aspects when studying the various power indexes.
It can be assumed that "any non-omniscient Being (i.e. any frail human being) probably can never apprehend the true objective fact" (Kent 1951: 42) , but subjectivity may indeed be useful in contributing new ideas from previously ignored perspectives. The National Security Index (NSI), which was developed by the Indian National Security Council Secretariat in 2002, has an Indian flavor: it initially emphasized human development and later included ecology, as India-where the population density is higher than in Japan-is known for mass poverty and overcrowding. It is tempting to suspect that Indian IR analysts in general would be rather fond of GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) rather than at the official exchange rate (OER) as this would immediately triple their economic size, but such a general subjective preference cannot be confirmed. 1 The argument could be made that Indian power indexes are relevant because India is increasingly relevant, but this would then imply that the power indexes of smaller countries are less relevant. The Indian power indexes may be regarded as a symptom of India's ascendancy to global power, but any hypothetical attribution of power indexes to growth in power can be expected to suffer from self-selection bias, which means that the increased public availability of some indexes' data vis-à-vis less available indexes distorts perception. Indians have most likely constructed power indexes before, and it may simply be the Internet that makes those Indian power indexes constructed nowadays internationally traceable. PreInternet Indian power indexes may never be resuscitated without considerable research on the part of Indian scholars themselves. 1 The NSI uses OER. The Indian economist Arvind Virmani developed his own power index in 2004/05; he repeatedly insists that PPP is the better measure and resents any notion that OER may be as good or better. The basis for his claim is a rather unconcealed nationalist bias regarding the ranking of India (see Virmani 2004 Virmani , 2005a Virmani , 2005b Virmani , 2005c Virmani , 2005d ).
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The paper is structured as follows: sections 2 & 3 seek to briefly illuminate the context of the NSI. The objective of these sections is to, in general terms, connect the NSI to India as far as the latter's great-power aspirations and strategic culture are concerned. Section 2 explains India's attempt to attain great-power status and its economic performance. Section 3 returns to India's strategic culture, looking at the role of power in the Arthashastra by Kautilya, which is the key text in this respect.
Sections 4 to 7 seek to connect the NSI to its specific institutional and theoretical roots.
Section 4 examines the institutional origin of the NSI as the basis for its development. Section 5 traces the ideational roots and intellectual heritage that culminated in the development of the NSI in order to distinguish the intellectual baggage from preceding efforts in power measurement by other analysts from the fresh impulses of the designers of the NSI. Section 6 focuses on the theoretical basis for the unique emphasis of the early NSI on human security as well as on the conceptual problematic involved. Section 7 looks critically at the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI) as these indexes were integrated into the early NSI with its focus on human security.
Section 8 may be of interest only to experts on the technical aspects of power formulas.
However, it is crucial to understanding why the NSI has not managed to produce satisfactory numbers. Section 9 demonstrates through thematic weighting and correlation analysis how the NSI has effectively abandoned its original emphasis on human security and looks at possible reasons for this. Section 10 investigates how the NSI has been received as well as the criticisms of it. The latter may contain suggestions for further improvement. Section 11 concludes the inquiry by looking at the two big issues facing the NSI, which are (1) the inclusion/exclusion of human security and (2) the inadequacy of results due to the absence of a unified calculation standard, and offers suggestions for further research.
For readers who want to see the five published versions of the NSI itself, Appendix A provides details on the index's changing composition. The complete results of the five published indexes can be found in Appendix B.
Geopolitical Challenges in India's Quest for Great-power Status
I have a THIRD vision. India must stand up to the world. Because I believe that unless India stands up to the world, no one will respect us. Only strength respects strength.
We must be strong not only as a military power but also as an economic power. Both must go hand-in-hand.
Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam
Eleventh President of India (2002-2007), 2006 In the index of Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics from 2001, one finds 65 entries for the People's Republic of China and 3 entries for India (Mearsheimer 2001: 538, 543 ), a 8 Karl Hwang: Measuring Geopolitical Power in India fact which is symptomatic for the low prestige that India has suffered so far. Yet in recent years it has become increasingly fashionable to laud India's ascendance to the rank of global power (Basu 2008: 396) . The problem is pinpointing the timing of India's entry into the league of great powers. The Pokhran-II nuclear tests from May 11-13, 1998 could represent a suitable date, but only because India successfully weathered the resulting sanctions. These tests were surely meant to validate India's claim to great-power status (Nayar/Paul: 27; Perkovich 2003: 5) . 2 In contrast, India's low point in economic development may be established as 1979, though relative to China the difference in wealth has never been as great as today. The time period 1947-1979 was marked by Fabian semi-socialism, less so in terms of ownership than in terms of control through the ill-famed Licence Raj. 3 The relatively stable per capita growth rate of just over 1 percent during this period became known as the "Hindu rate of growth."
Moderate reforms were initiated in the 1980s; however, large fiscal deficits during this time period spilled over into the trade deficit and thus brought about a serious balance of payments crisis in 1991, when the Indian government was close to default on its external obligations. This crisis sparked the push for more drastic reforms aimed at further economic liberalization from 1991 to 1993. Compared to its unsustainable growth track of the 1980s, India now looks to be on a sustainable path as all critical debt ratios 4 have developed in a favorable direction.
Countless scholars have emphasized the importance of war in proving national power. Karl Haushofer 5 stated that the ultimate test of national strength is war (Haushofer 1913: 8) ;
George Perkovich stated in a more recent lecture on India that war provides the empirical test of military power (Perkovich 2003 (Perkovich : 14, 2004 ; and Chang Chin-Lung referred to "one-on-one all-out conflicts, as the acid test for power equations" (Chang 2004: 21) . India 2 In this regard the role of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) elites in pushing for an overt nuclear program in 1998 can also be mentioned. The BJP bases its ideology on "Hindutva," which demands Hindu nationalism, one nation, one religion, and one country. Its ideology comes from the Arthashastra and states that India should be strong. A pertinent book on this issue is Christophe Jaffrelot, ed. 2007. Hindu Nationalism: A Reader.
Delhi: Permanent Black. The Licence Raj (1947 Raj ( -1990 refers to a bureaucratic system that set quotas for businesses as to how much of a certain product they were allowed to manufacture. The quantity of goods was therefore not determined freely by supply and demand. 4 That is (1) Debt Stock- GDP Ratio 1990 -1991 1999 -2000 (2) Debt-Service Ratio 1990 -1991 1999 -2000 (3) Debt-Exports Ratio 1990 -1991 1999 -2000 ; (4) Short-term Debt/Total Debt 1990 -1991 1999 -2000 and (5) Short-term Debt/Foreign Currency Reserves 1990-1991: 382.3; 1999 -2000 : 11.5 (Baru 2003 . 5 Karl Haushofer has been much criticized over the connection between German geopolitics and Nazi expansion; nevertheless, geopolitics has been regaining some of its popularity, which also encourages a differenti- Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. Historically, major victories and major defeats have been the entry and exit points for membership in the league of great powers, so the pressing problem for India "is the absence of a peaceful mechanism for rising powers to gain acceptance in the international hierarchy" (Nayar/Paul 2003: 7-8, 35 ). Great-power status may well be an arbitrary judgment; most definitions of it are near tautological, employing arbitrary cutoffs as to capability and timing (see Levy 1983: 11-19) .
Mathematically the issue is one of determining thresholds for dividing countries into divergent classes with emerging attributes clearly associated with a higher level of capability. 6 A promising indicator of great-power capability may be the level of employment in arms production; thus, the five members of the UN Security Council happened to also be the five countries with the largest employment in arms production as late as 2003. Arms production is India's weak point "as it is heavily dependent on external suppliers for major weapons systems such as fighter aircraft and advanced munitions" (Nayar/Paul 2003: 44) . One measure of Indian diplomacy in the future will be how it either lowers the value of a Security Council seat and therefore makes India's power ranking independent of such a position, or alternatively how India attains a seat. (Perkovich 2003: 19) Indians may like to imagine India as a vegetarian elephant (see Virmani 2005a: 8), but sooner or later frustrated impatience could possibly lead to adventurism. 7 Some may assert India's peaceful nature, especially as a democracy, but democratic peace theory merely states that democracies don't fight other democracies (see Mearsheimer 2001: 16) , and as India's neighbors aren't democracies, they "remain part of the devalued out-group, and legitimate targets of violence" (Johnston 1995: 60-61) . Indians understandably resist the disadvantages of being underestimated but seem to forget that being considered too powerful too soon might be worse. The Chinese have wisely followed Deng Xiaoping's 24 Character Strategy 8 in order to avoid preemptive containment strategies.
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Charu Majumdar (1918 Majumdar ( -1972 most eloquently expressed this frustrated impatience in the context of guerrilla warfare: "Mere collection of arms does not alter the character of struggle-the guns collected have to be used" (Majumdar 1965 -1967 .
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Translated as "observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership" (USDOD 2007: 6). For Kautilya power is the means and not the end, so "strength is power, and happiness is the end.
[…] Hence a king shall always endeavor to augment his own power and elevate his happiness" (Kautilya, Arthashastra 6.2). Further, "the possession of a prosperous treasury and a strong army is the strength of sovereignty" (Kautilya, Arthashastra 6.2). As for the seven "constituents of the state," Kautilya listed "Swamy (King), Amatya (Prime Minister), Janapada (populated territory), Durga (fort), Ksha (treasury), Bala (force / army) and Mitra (ally)" (Naik 2004 ).
For the augmentation of power the general rule applies that "whoever is inferior to another shall make peace with him; whoever is superior in power shall wage war" (Kautilya, Arthashastra 7.1), so power is the basis for the acquisition of more power. For successful warfare "the conqueror should know the comparative strength and weakness of himself and of his enemy" (Kautilya, Arthashastra 9.1), and comparison entails measurement according to Sun Zi. 9
As for the important connection between economics and military matters, Sanjaya Baru has recently reiterated Kautilya's argument as follows:
The management of the economy, and of the treasury, has been a vital aspect of state- Given that every power index is the idiosyncratic product of its author and its institutional environment, some information regarding which people and institutions the NSI has depended on in its formation and evolution is provided here. This provides some context regarding the motivations and viewpoints that went into the NSI.
The National Security Council (NSC) was set up on November 19, 1998 to overcome structural deficiencies in the coordination of national security. The council originally included the newly created national security advisor (NSA); the ministers of defense, external affairs, home, and finance; and the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission. The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) was established in April 1999 and succeeded, with expanded responsibility, the existing Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which had been largely limited to producing a monthly intelligence review (Chandra 2006: 209, 215 ).
The nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as prime minister, had come to power on March 19, 1998, two months before the Pokhran-II nuclear tests from May 11-13, 1998. It had then established a task force to study the national security mechanisms of other countries and to submit recommendations on revamping the Indian system, the result being the NSC and other subgroupings (Raman 2004 (Raman , 2005 . Apurba
Kundu comments that "in a marked departure from previous national governments, those led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) sought to address national security issues both proactively and strategically in line with the party's philosophy of achieving a strong India" (Kundu 2004a: 4) .
Satish Chandra served as chairman of the JIC from January 1999 to April 1999, and then as deputy NSA and secretary of the NSCS from April 1999 to February 2005. He emphasizes that the NSC was intended to be geared towards a more holistic view of national security that included "issues like good governance, health, water management, environment, technology or even the economy" in addition to conventional topics such as "insurgencies and law and order, terrorism, foreign policy, etc." (Chandra 2006: 202, see also 207) . In addition to evaluating the intelligence collected by other agencies, the NSCS became a quasi think tank that initiated papers on human security as well as national security (Chandra 2006: 217) .
The NSI appears to have been one outgrowth of the secretariat's assertive creativity.
There appears to have been some institutional resentment between the traditional ministries and the newly established NSC and NSCS as a result of their different outlooks.
Chandra states that "regrettably, the political and bureaucratic leadership continues to remain wedded to a damage control mode rather than a more cerebral long-term policy evolution mode" (Chandra 2006: 224) . The relatively new NSCS seems to have lost out in this institutional power struggle: ministries have not sought advice from it on a routine basis, and it has not been informed on all relevant issues (Chandra 2006: 224-225 The deputy chairman of the Planning Commission is no longer a member of the NSC, and the JIC has been revived in competition with the NSC; the NSC had originally replaced the JIC.
As one of its many projects, the NSCS has funded the India's National Security Annual
Review ( (Kumar 2006 (Kumar : 318, 2007 , alongside its regular statistics section, its structural patterns and emphases are unquestionably in the tradition of geopolitics.
In terms of a rough genealogical outline (see Hwang possibly due to quantification problems encountered in transforming a great deal of meticulously detailed theory (212 pages!) into practically useful calculations (see Tellis et al. 2000a Tellis et al. , 2000b ). In the introduction to the NSI 2003 Kumar states in regard to the Tellis approach that "it is obvious that all these factors are not quantifiable" (Kumar 2004b: 228 Statistics was mostly defined as "statecraft" (Staatskunde) until 1850, while from 1850 onwards most definitions considered statistics a methodological science. Hybrid definitions fall mostly into the period 1846-1854 (Klezl 1940: 12) . In England statistics was known as "political arithmetic" before 1798, when the German word Statistik was then imported as "statistics" (Witt 1993 : 1-2).
created by Wang Songfen; it consisted of 64 variables grouped into eight major areas, as outlined in Table 2 . Similar to his comment on the Tellis approach, Kumar states that "many of these factors are again not quantifiable" (Kumar 2004b: 229) , which is not true, as total CNP values have been calculated using the CASS formula. Thus Kumar is probably referring to factors for which experts had to be surveyed. It can be argued that perception values are less reliable than material data, while at the same time perception surveys are much more work. In terms of basic structure the CASS is not far away from the NSI, and according to Pillsbury it is not clear whether the CASS index uses a unified standard for handling aggregates and per capita values. Sanjaya Baru (former media adviser to the prime minister) comments that "based on such concepts, the INSAR's National Security Index (NSI) for India is an attempt to construct a simpler index" (Baru 2005: 113) .
The social development level in the CASS formula consists of (1) educational level, (2) cultural level, (3) health-care level, (4) communications, and (5) As for the name of the NSI itself, the NSI does not directly measure national security. It does so only indirectly, as evidenced by the introduction of the original NSI, where it is stated that "a country's national security is safeguarded not just by its armed forces but by its comprehensive national power" (NSCS 2003: 349) . The difference between national power and security is that the notion of national power tends to take a short-term view of international relations while national security provides a long-term perspective on international relations, psychologically speaking.
From National Security to Human Security
Interstate military conflicts have decreased relative to domestic conflicts and violence. This tendency has changed the focus of security thinking. National security has traditionally been concerned with territorial integrity and arms races, but given that the international environment is relatively stable and that international treaties no longer guarantee domestic peace, a closer look at conflicts is required in order to link domestic stability and security with human development. Accordingly, individuals rather than states move to the center of attention, for individuals are the primary consumers of insecurity in terms of civilian deaths and, equally, And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP 1994: 23) . Human security consists of (1) economic security, (2) food security, (3) health security, (4) environmental security, (5) personal security, (6) community security, and (7) political security (UNDP 1994: 24-25) . Critics have argued that human security may altogether be a manipulative attempt "'to capture some of the more substantial political interest and superior financial resources' associated with more traditional, military conceptions of security" (Paris 2001: 95) .
The problem with concepts of human security is that they tend to be too broad and fuzzy, making it hard to discern a difference between human development and human security (see Trachsler 2003: 75-76) . Sanjaya Baru states that "the UNDP's Human Development Report tries to capture trends in 'human security' through measurement of human development" (Baru 2005: 112) . Moreover, it can be argued that human security runs counter to national security, so that human security can be construed as an invitation to humanitarian in-tervention that disregards and undermines state sovereignty (see Trachsler 2003: 70, 77-78, 85-86, 102) .
Efforts have been made to quantify human security (Trachsler 2003: 79-81 Apurba Kundu considers human security to be the basis of the original NSI, and he implicitly commends the NSI for this (Kundu 2004b ). Kundu displays some naïveté when he asks "What do highly expensive military modernisation items do for the human security of the individual citizen?" (Kundu 2004b :7) because in a democracy human security should be more the concern of the police and not a question of direct military prowess, as the question implies. Still, India is a poor country where capital is scarce, so synergy effects are desirable in order to optimize the use of resources and capabilities. This may suggest that expenditures on national security enhance human security, at least with regard to insurgencies such as the Maoist-Naxalite insurrection and the conflict over Kashmir.
The Human Development Index and the Environmental Vulnerability Index
The first two NSI publications contained the Human Development Index (HDI), which was perhaps the most prominent feature of the NSI. The HDI was developed by Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq (1934 -1998 . Prior to its development Haq had explained to fellow Indian economist Amartya Sen, ʺ'we need a measure of the same level of vulgarity as the GNP-just one number-but a measure that is not as blind to social aspect (sic) of human lives as the GNP is'" (Sen 1998 ). This vulgar measure happened to be the HDI, which was published with the first Human Development Report 1990 and has been published annually ever since. The HDI basically tends to inflate the development level of poor countries compared to GDP, whether at the official exchange rate (OER) or in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). Sen explains that Haq was an optimist opposed to the pessimism that the exclusive reliance on GDP generates. 12
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The NSI has adopted the basic methodology of the HDI, but without using a unified standard (see Section 8)
for treating values either as aggregates or per capita values or otherwise. The HDI seeks to represent per capita development, and the NSI seeks to represent the aggregate power of nations, but in using the HDI meth- cator on this scale are arbitrary, but they represent the best estimate possible given the complexity of matter (Pratt et al. 2004: 14) . A composite score is calculated from these 50 indicators. The EVI has a number of problematic indicators that construct an irreconcilable opposition between human development and environmental sustainability. For example, one indicator ("use of electricity for industry over the last 5 years per square kilometre of land") negatively evaluates economic activity per se; it does not take into account the type of industry, the source of electricity, or the environmental standards in place to limit and compensate for damage to the environment. This means that a primitive lifestyle always scores better regardless of the actual damage caused. Another issue is those indicators that are a fixed feature of the environment and independent of human action ("number of volcanoes"); practically, they may render the index static.
The Lack of a Unified Standard in the Calculation of the NSI
The changing composition of the NSI in various years is documented in Appendix A, the results in Appendix B. The most important observation from a technical point of view is that the NSI's different subindexes have random shares of aggregate and per capita variables, as well as of attributable variables that are neither. Aggregate values measure the sum total of a variable in a given country, for example, the "total number of patents." 13 Per capita values odology without adjustment, the result is a technical disaster that produces questionable end results. In any case the HDI is not without flaws either, and for this reason it is useful to take a critical look at the HDI itself.
The HDI consists of three subindexes: (1) life expectancy, (2) education comprising adult literacy and gross enrollment, and (3) GDP-PPP. While the areas of these subindexes seem optimal for its purpose, the HDI's method of calculation is careless and inconsistent. For life expectancy 85 is arbitrarily taken as the upper limit and 25 as the lower limit, instead of the real maximum and minimum values. The CIA Factbook explains most eloquently that "rounding of numbers always results in a loss of precision-i.e., error" (CIA 2009: FAQ). For literacy and gross enrollment no minimum value is used in the calculation. For gross enrollment and GDP-PPP a completely arbitrary upper limit is applied, beyond which no differences will be registered; for GDP-PPP an equally arbitrary lower limit is applied. Given that adult literacy has reached saturation in developed countries, the measure is worthless in comparing such countries. The logarithm is used only for GDP-PPP, though it would make more sense to apply it all subindexes, so that relationships are preserved in the composite index scale. Instead, the numerical value of the HDI is more or less devoid of meaningful information; the only usefulness is in determining rank. India is ranked 128 out of 177 countries measured (UNDP 2007: 128).
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Complications arise when these aggregates happen to measure something negative like "energy imports" (i.e., the more energy imported, the weaker the country). The criticism can be made that ongoing changes in composition and weighting prohibit year-to-year comparisons. While this is true to some extent, it is exactly these ongoing changes that mark the NSI as a creative and well-run experiment, despite all the misgivings.
Any demand for temporal uniformity would kill this creativity, as the NSI would no longer be free to use all available variables, including many of recent origin, to sustain continuous quality improvement.
Four minor issues remain: (1) To multiply the HDI by the population leads to imprecision because HDI values are in theory stretched between maximum and minimum and not is that the more negative aggregates are used, the more likely the linear calculations could result in negative sum totals, so that a country would have a negative value as total power, which is illogical. Because of this, such negative aggregates are counted as "Neither" in Table 3 . Principal Surface Combatants (PSC) are not counted in a consistent manner in The Military Balance; that is, sometimes corvettes are included in the number and sometimes not. An alternative to counting PSC is to look at tonnage (see Martello 1990: 16-17, 67-68) .
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In 1976 the Pentagon developed the concept of "Armored Division Equivalent" (ADE), which combined many factors to measure conventional force. By 1988 this had been refined into "Division Equivalent Firepower"
(DEF) (see also Martello 1990: 36); the information available on the Internet about these measures is limited.
The Trend in the Composition of the NSI Towards the Abandonment of Human Security
As can be seen from Table 4 , the first three publications of the NSI had a relatively strong human-security element. This is most evident in the NSI 2004. Then a break occurred in 2005, when the NSI wasn't published, and now the element is hardly visible. It's discouraging that the latest correlation coefficient is also the highest, which could suggest that the NSI has settled somewhat and that less variation in its composition might thus be expected in future revisions.
Kumar points out that "these long-term [nontraditional security] issues […] cannot be mixed with indices of instantly usable power" (Kumar 2007: 446) , providing one hint of justification for this drastic measure of excluding human security. The justification itself is of a practical nature, as any advances in the national security sectors tend to directly increase the power of government, a better economy immediately contributes higher tax revenues, military assets are directly available in a conflict, etc. Any advances in human security tend to do so only indirectly: education provides a basis for technology, decreased poverty may support political stability, etc. Another reason for excluding human security is that sometimes no change seems to take place in the status of a country on issues like health, education, environment, etc. for years. These three issues have thus been put in a separate index in the INSAR 2006 because they may not need to be reproduced every year. Still, Kumar is aware 22 Karl Hwang: Measuring Geopolitical Power in India that India has to do a lot to move up the ladder with regard to its international ranking on these issues.
The INSAR has regularly included one or two articles on human-security issues. Satish
Kumar himself has stated that military capability is still the most important component of national power (Kumar 2002: 20) . The progressive force behind the original NSI was probably Satish Chandra, the secretary of the NSCS from 1999 to 2005. He vehemently pushed a holistic line in a retrospective essay on the NSCS, going so far as to imply that a holistic understanding of security was what necessitated the NSC and NSCS to come into being (Chandra 2006: 201-202, 205-208) . Satish Chandra seems to have had the support of his supe- NSCS 2003 , Kumar 2004b Retired lieutenant general V.R. Raghavan is considered one of India's leading strategic thinkers; his criticism of the NSI 2007 as a feature of the INSAR 2007 is that the "rankings in the book seem to bear no relation to the real security status of these states" (Raghavan 2008 ).
Raghavan seems to object to India being ranked above the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. He also seems to object to Sweden being ranked above Brazil and Pakistan. Moreover, Raghavan states that "these rankings do not also help in formulating security policy and plans for the future. It is hoped that a more realistic security ranking of states can be presented in the next volume of the series" (Raghavan 2008 Norway is certainly a very rich country due to its offshore oil and the high level of social infrastructure typical of Scandinavian countries, which makes it outstanding on a per capita scale, but it is still a country with less than five million people. The NSI mixes aggregate variables, per capita variables, and other attributable variables together in the most careless manner, so that such results not only become possible but likely. If something can be learned from the NSI, it is that a unified standard is a sine qua non for a power index. The easiest solution would be to transform all variables into positive aggregates before adding them up according to their weights. Hopefully this will happen in the next NSI.
Further research should be devoted to identifying other power indexes that may have been constructed in India before the arrival of the Internet. While the NSI is the major power index produced in the country, it is essentially an Indian adaptation of the Sino-Japanese CNP concept, so trilateral comparisons seem opportune. An intriguing cultural research issue along these lines could be whether an Asian mode of thought is seeking and finding expression in these power formulas. Any early conclusions on this topic are dangerous as power formulas are too few to prove such hypotheses statistically; however, the limited set of available formulas encourages speculation. George Perkovich mentioned the Population Index (PI) in a lecture, but he incorrectly stated that the PI ranked India twenty-seventh of the 29 countries included (Perkovich 2003: 9) . In fact this is the HDI ranking by itself, without being multiplied by population. In an article based on his lecture, he corrected his mistake and stated correctly that India is ranked second out of 29 countries (Perkovich 2004: 131) . As can be seen from the The most notable change was the addition of energy security (C). Further national health and environmental vulnerability indicators were dropped altogether. Information for these indexes came from the World Development Indicators (1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) and the Military Balance 2003 . For 5 and 7 to 8, values are normalized using the maximum value. For 1 to 4, 6, and 9 to 11, values are normalized using the maximum value and the minimum value. Further supplemental indexes on health, education and environmental security were offered, but those indexes no longer constituted a part of the NSI. The most notable change was the addition of "population aged 15-64" alongside other variables to effective population (E). This variable is purely demographic and has nothing to do with human development, the previously synthetic variable for effective population having been dropped. Further changes were the addition of more variables for defense capability (B) and technological strength (D). Information for these indexes came from the World Development Indicators 2007 (1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17) and the Military Balance 2006 . For 5 to 8 and 11 to 14, values are normalized using the maximum value. For 1 to 4, 9 to 10 and 15 to 17, values are normalized using the maximum value and the minimum value.
No NSI was calculated for 2008. Kumar 2004b Kumar , 2005 Kumar , 2008 
APPENDIX B: Complete List of Results from the NSI, 2002-2007

